Reflections on Environmental Liability Schemes in the United States and European Union: Limitations and Prospects for Improvement by Ashford, Nicholas A.
 1
REFLECTIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY SCHEMES IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION: LIMITATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT* 
 
Nicholas Askounes Ashford 
Professor of Technology and Policy 
Director MIT Technology and Law Program 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
Introduction 
 
We are constantly confronted with cases of severe damage to the environment resulting from 
human acts. High profile cases capture the international community’s attention briefly such 
as the infamous 1989 Exxon Valdez oil release in Alaska’s Prince William Sound and more 
recently, the accident with the Erika oil tanker in the South of Spain, two examples of cases 
where human activities have resulted in substantial damage to the environment. In addition to 
these catastrophic events, mankind also releases countless harmful substances to land, water, 
and air on a daily basis.  Both the United States and the European Union responded to create 
liability schemes for damage to the environment, although some two decades apart.  Neither 
scheme provides for liability for personal injury or property values, leaving that to the 
individual 50 U.S. states and the Member States of the European Union, respectively.   
 
For an environmental liability system to be effective, the regulation of hazardous and solid 
waste (and air and water pollution) must be linked policy-wise to environmental liability 
initiatives.  Environmental liability and environmental regulation are complementary schemes 
and must be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they advance the precautionary 
principle, pollution prevention, and public participation.  These are explicit tenets of 
European Union environmental law, but they are also appropriate benchmarks for the 
evaluation of any environmental liability scheme. 
 
The precautionary principle has two distinct formulations1 regarding the protection of the 
environment and public health: 
 
(1). Where there are possibilities of large or irreversible serious effects, scientific 
uncertainty should not prevent protective actions from being taken. 
(2). Where there are possibilities of large or irreversible serious effects, action should 
be taken, even if there is considerable scientific uncertainty. 
 
The first formulation in the international context appears prominently in the Brundtland 
formulation agreed to in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and recurs in many multilateral environmental 
agreements.  It constitutes what might be called a permissive use of precautionary measures.  
The second formulation appears in some multilateral agreements and in some European 
Union (EU) directives on environmental protection and requires precaution as a prescriptive 
measure2.  In the context of environmental liability, limiting the reach of the precautionary 
                                                 
* Presented at the Conference on Environmental Liability, Piraeus Bar Association, Piraeus, Greece, 26-27 June 
2009. 
1 de Sadeleer, N. (2002) Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
2 See especially de Sadeleer, 2007 and Ashford, 2007. 
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principle minimizes societal protection and environmental restoration because scientific 
uncertainties and the lack of sufficient data will be trumped by potentially large restoration or 
remediation costs 
 
Options for addressing responsibility for environmental damage from pollution range from 
(1) preventing pollution at the source by changing the inputs, process technology and 
methods, and final products of industrial, agricultural, and transport activities, (2) 
minimizing, eliminating, or otherwise preventing further proliferation of releases of harmful 
substances into the environment,  (3) remediating damage and/or restoring environmental 
areas, and (4) compensating those harmed or the government as the societal trustee.  Later 
stage interventions, or backwards-focused pressure/incentives after contamination has already 
occurred, are the least effective means of achieving prevention.  In other words, the 
prevention of the spreading of contamination (remediation) is not the same as preventing the 
releases in the first place (control) or preventing the use of toxic materials in production and 
products (primary prevention). 
 
Invoking the polluter-pays principle at the end of the pollution life-cycle is either likely to be 
excessively costly or to lead to inadequate societal protection/environmental restoration.  
Furthermore, barriers to invoking the precautionary principle at the end of the pollution life-
cycle is likely to lead to inadequate societal protection/environmental restoration. 
 
Finally, limiting public participation – especially where government is reluctant to act -- is 
likely to lead to inadequate societal protection/environmental restoration. 
 
There is a dual legal system relevant to environmental protection and liability in both the US 
and the EU, but they are different.  The US authority for regulation and liability are divided 
between the Federal and state governments, but there is little ambiguity as to responsibilities 
and remedies.  The division of authority between the EU and its Member States is evolving, 
is sometimes unclear, and results in legal loopholes inviting non-action as the discussion 
below illustrates.  
 
U.S. Environmental Liability 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), and Superfund Amendments of 1986, addressed environmental liability in the 
U.S. The law established strict liability for polluters of land and water (except for pesticide 
applicators, petroleum, fuels, and most nuclear materials) in sites qualifying for National 
Priority List (NPL) designation3, and also set up a Hazardous Response Trust Fund (the 
Superfund) that was to be used to clean up toxic contaminants for which a financially-solvent 
polluter could not be found4.  A tax on the chemical and petroleum industries populated the 
fund.  The act imposed joint, several, and retroactive liability which meant that if any polluter 
was unable to pay for the cleanup at a particular site, then the burden was imposed on other 
contributors who could be said to be required to pay “more than their fair share” of the 
cleanup expenses. To date, billions of dollars have been spent and not all the designated sites 
have been cleaned up.  
                                                 
3 States have the option to keep a site off the federal NPL list and address the remediation themselves, reflecting 
a major concern of effects on the property values in the contaminated community. 
4 After a high of $3.8 billion in 1987, the fund remained insolvent since 2003.  In early 2009, a bill reauthorizing 
the tax was introduced in the US House of Representatives (The Superfund Polluter Pays Act of 2009, H.R. 832) 
and is expected to pass the Senate. 
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Polluters are expected to report and remediate releases in excess of thresholds listed in the 
Act for some 700 ‘hazardous substances’ and also for other ‘pollutants/contaminants’.  
Clean-up standards are based on the most restrictive federal and applicable state standard.  
Note, however, that the federal water-based Maximum Contaminant Levels are presently 
relaxed as a result of intense industry lobbying in the prior decade.  Polluters are expected to 
remediate sites to levels indicated by those standards, unless the sites qualify for ‘brownfield 
status.’  Brownfields’ designation allows sites to be cleaned up to a lesser degree for use as 
commercial property, partly satisfying some ‘environmental justice’ communities with the 
prospects of economic development (Ashford and Rest, 2001) 
  
In addition to joint, several, and retroactive liability for contamination, the Act envisioned 
establishing financial responsibility assurances requiring that at-risk firms set aside surety 
bonds or designated funds in the event that future contamination occurred from their 
operations.  These provisions of Act were never implemented, but in May 2009, a federal 
district ordered EPA to carry out the first step of preparing and listing industries that would 
have to demonstrate such financial responsibility (Sierra Club v. EPA, N.D. Cal,. No. C 08-
1409, Feb 25, 2009). 
 
In December 2004, the EPA (2004) projected that as many as 350,000 contaminated sites will 
require cleanup over the next 30 years, assuming current regulations and practices remain the 
same. The bill for this cleanup may amount to as much as $250 billion. In its report, the EPA 
(2004) provides an estimation of remaining hazardous wastes sites needing remediation 
efforts (Figure 1). EPA explains:5 
 
According to the report, there will be a need to address many smaller sites such as those 
containing Underground Storage Tanks (UST) (43% of the total sites) and various hazardous 
waste properties (50% of the total sites). These two site categories, however, only account for 
twenty two percent of the costs. The remaining seven percent of sites, including those on the 
National Priorities List and U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Energy sites, tend 
to be larger, more complex and more costly to remediate and will thus require a larger share 
of funding. … There is a trend toward more risk-based cleanup approaches and more attention 
to redevelopment of cleaned up sites in selecting and implementing remedies in most cleanup 
programs. Underlying these trends is the acceptance, in recent years of improved approaches 
to site characterization, which has been demonstrated to lead to faster, cheaper, and better 
cleanups.  
 
                                                 
5 Source: EPA, Superfund, New Report Projects Number, Cost and Nature of Contaminated Site Cleanups in the 
U.S. Over Next 30 Years, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/news/30years.htm (accessed on 01/28/09). 
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Figure 1: Estimated Number of Hazardous Waste Sites 2004-2033  
 
While recovery for personal injury and damage to property is left to the already-existing 
remedies available in the 50 individual states, CERCLA/SARA did establish the Agency for 
Toxic Substances & Disease Registry (ATSDR) which (1) keeps a registry of exposures and 
diseases attributable to toxic substances, (2) constructs toxicological profiles of chemicals, 
and (3) performs preliminary health risk assessments at sites that are candidate for 
remediation.  There has been enormous contention over sites/contaminated communities that 
have a multitude of so-called “low-level exposures”, no one of which has firm toxicological 
or epidemiological evidence of significant risk.  Yet those communities suffer a myriad of 
health problems.  ATSDR was created because the public did not trust EPA’s assessment of 
risk.  However, under the previous administration, ATSDR has lost the confidence of the 
public and did not apply the precautionary principle in its assessments. 
 
Citizens not only have standing to intervene in government decisions (including judicial 
review), but also have access to the courts for injunctive relief against the government if it 
does not act.  Exemptions from liability is provided for non-managing lenders, some 
‘innocent purchasers’, non-negligent contractors.  Also exempted from joint and several 
liability are Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) who bear the burden of proving non-
responsibility (where pollution type is identifiable and divisible) or of demonstrating that 
their pollution is reliably attributable in size (Liptak, 2009). 
 
European Union Environmental Liability 
 
Taking into consideration the trials and tribulations of the U.S. Superfund model of 
environmental liability, the European Commission issued a White Paper on Environmental 
Liability in February 2000. The objective of the White Paper was to provide for strict liability 
for conventional and environmental damage caused by ‘dangerous’ activities regulated by EC 
law, and fault liability for natural resource damage caused by non-dangerous activities 
(Bergkamp 2000). A visual representation of the EU environmental liability envisioned in the 
White Paper is represented in Figure 2. Note, however that liability for ‘traditional damages’ 
(personal injury and property damage was excised from the final Directive 2005/35/EC).  The 
White Paper addressed the preventative, precautionary, and polluter pays principles and how 
these can best be applied to serve the aims of Community environmental policy.  
 
Bergkamp (2000) argued that the EC’s argument in the White Paper was weak, and that a 
liability regime might not ensure further decontamination and restoration of the environment 
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nor boost the implementation of compliance, since Member States are already required to 
protect and restore damaged natural resources, and mandate remediation of contaminated 
sites through a liability regime. For cases where environmental damage is widespread without 
a clear link to the activities of any individual actors (called ‘diffuse pollution’), the 
Commission argued that liability is not a suitable instrument. Examples of diffuse, multi-
source damage includes climate change due to CO2 emissions, forest damage caused by acid 
rain, air pollution effects from industry or traffic, and fertilizer and pesticide runoff. These 
shared environmental problems, as discussed elsewhere in this book and chapter, are the 
subject of many emerging international agreements, protocols, negotiations, and the like. 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2000, p. 9). 
 
Figure 2: Scope of EC Environmental Liability Regime Envisioned by the White Paper 
(note: traditional damages were ultimately eliminated by the EU Directive 2004/35/EC) 
 
However, despite criticisms of the strict and fault liability regime outlined in the White Paper, 
the EC was not discouraged by the disappointing U.S. experience with civil liability regimes 
for environmental harm. The EC commented:6  
 
So far, the Member States of the European Union have established national environmental 
liability regimes that cover damage to persons and goods, and they have introduced laws to 
deal with liability for, and clean up of, contaminated sites. However, until now, these national 
regimes have not really addressed the issue of liability for damage to nature. This is one 
reason why economic actors have focused on their responsibilities to other people's health or 
property, but have not tended to consider their responsibilities for damage to the wider 
environment. This has been seen traditionally as a ‘public good’ for which society as a whole 
should be responsible, rather than something the individual actor who actually caused the 
damage should bear. The introduction of liability for damage to nature, as proposed in the 
White Paper, is expected to bring about a change of attitude that should result in an increased 
level of prevention and precaution. 
 
On adoption of the White Paper by the Commission, Environment Commissioner Margot 
Wallström stated: “We have now laid the foundations for an environmental liability regime 
                                                 
6 Source: European Commission, Environmental Liability, White Paper on Environmental Liability, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/liability/white_paper.htm (accessed on 08/20/04). 
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for Europe. Legislation in this field will provide common rules to ensure that polluters will 
effectively be held responsible for environmental damage they cause. This will improve 
protection of the health of Europeans and our natural environment.” 
… 
 
In case of environmental damage, the compensation to be paid by the polluter should be spent 
on the effective restoration of the damage. Furthermore, for cases concerning environmental 
damage, public interest groups should have a right to step into the shoes of public authorities, 
where these are responsible for tackling environmental damage but have not acted. Such 
groups should also be allowed to take action in urgent cases if there is a need to prevent 
damage. This is in line with the 1998 Århus Convention on access to information, public 
participation in decision-making and access to justice, a UN/ECE Convention that has been 
signed by the Community and all the EU Member States, as well as by other states. 
 
In April 2004, some twenty-four years after the US’s adoption of CERCLA, the European 
Community adopted the EU Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability,7 addressing the 
prevention and remedying of environmental damage.8 The directive has had much opposition 
from industry, but despite this resistance, the Committee voted in favor of strict rules and 
called for a wide financial and legal accountability of polluters. Under the new directive, the 
polluter pays principle is fundamental and demonstrates that in many cases the operator who 
causes damage should be held liable, i.e., be financially responsible. The directive aims to 
ensure that future environmental damage is paid by the polluter, and preferably prevented. 
The directive specifically included the issues of biodiversity and nature damage, water and 
land contamination, and damage from genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
 
The Directive 2004/35/EC has been the subject of much commentary and criticism and is 
acknowledged to be significantly weaker than the approaches recommended in the White 
Paper (Betlem, 2005; Fogelman, 2006; Krämer, 2005; and Winter et al., 2008).  The 
following outlines the ultimate scheme: 
 
● Areas of Liability for Operators (private and public) 
» For Prevention and Restoration (Remediation) of Environmental Damage to 
water soil/land, and protected species and natural habitats  
– Strict, joint, and several liability for damage caused after April 30, 
2007 for ‘occupational activities’ listed in Annex III reflecting IPPC 
permitting and 11 other Directives including the Water Directive, and 
directives addressing Waste Management, and Air Pollution  
» For restoration/remediation of damage to EU directive-protected species and 
natural habitats arising from ‘other [than Annex III] activities’: at fault 
liability (negligence) 
» Damage is assessed relative to the (before-hand) baseline conditions 
» Traditional damage (personal injury and damage to property) excluded 
» Thresholds 
– Water: significant adverse impacts on resource status (quality and 
quantity) 
                                                 
7 Source: EUR-LEX, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=52002PC0
017&model=guichett (accessed 08/26/04). 
8 Source: Europa, Environmental Liability, http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/liability/ (accessed on 
08/26/04). 
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– Soil: serious potential and actual harm to public health (soil erosion 
excluded)  
– Nature: significant adverse effects on the conservation status of the 
protected species & habitat. 
» Exemptions: oil spills and nuclear contamination 
 
● Operators (private and public) have a duty to: 
» Prevent, notify (report), and manage ‘environmental damage’ to land, water, 
protected species, and natural habitats 
» Prevent & remediate  ‘environmental damage’ associated with “dangerous or 
potentially dangerous occupational activities” [Annex III] 
» Primary duty: to act in response to any governmental order 
» Secondary duty: to bear the costs, premised on appropriate national law  
» May be not always be liable for damage to species and natural habitats (if not 
in the EU directives) 
» May be not always be liable for damage to water (if not required by the Water 
Directive) 
» May be liable for damage (contamination) to land, providing the damage 
creates a “significant risk” to human health.  (‘significant’ is undefined and 
creates an opportunity to impose a heavy evidentiary burden, not reflecting a 
precautionary approach).  Diffuse pollution damage excluded unless causal 
relationship established between alleged polluter(s) and damage. 
 
● Defenses available to Operators to defeat/reduce cost-bearing: 
» Mandatory 
– Operators acted in accordance with a compulsory government order 
– Damage was due to the act of an unconnected  third party 
» Optional (established by each Member State) 
– Practices of care were based on the then-recognized potential for 
environmental impact by the Member State (state-of-art defense) 
– Operator was allowed to conduct itself in accordance with a permit 
issued by a Member State in accordance with legislation listed in 
Annex III 
 
● Public Authorities: 
» Must require preventive or remedial action by operators 
– If damage has not yet occurred, required actions are to be determined 
by the appropriate Member State 
» May, but are not obliged to, take necessary measures in the case that 
– An operator is not identified, an operator doesn’t meet his/her 
obligations, or is not required to bear the costs (as a result of available 
defenses) 
– This in effect removes an enforceable mandatory state duty to act, 
unless required by other EU directives, e.g., the Water Directive. 
» May recover remediation/restoration costs incurred by the authority, providing 
the Member State required the operator to have a dedicated fund for 
remediation/restoration. 
 
● Citizens/NGOs: 
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» Procedural rights somewhat expanded in administrative proceedings, but not 
with regard to standing in courts, though there exists a right to judicial review 
for the decisions of authorities or their refusals to act. 
» Comments of Citizens/NGOs must be supported by evidence and their 
comments on preventive measures to be taken on land are allowed at the 
discretion of the Member State. 
» They can request public authorities to act, but Member States can sometimes 
restrict or delay their access to the courts, in practice. 
 
Commentary 
 
A number of criticisms can be applied to the directive.  While there are specific targets, e.g., 
good water quality by 2015 and favorable conservation status for birds and habitats, some 
benchmarks are lacking, such as specific reportable quantities of pollutants released (required 
under the US legislation).  Significant environmental damage may go unabated since, unlike 
the US, public authorities are not required to act in many instances where polluters are not 
identified or insolvent.   
 
Evidentiary burdens on citizens and NGOs are sometimes high or require too short a time to 
be borne, vitiating a precautionary approach.  Significantly enhanced public participation 
promised by the Aarhus Convention is not achieved. 
 
The prevention of pollution at the source is actually not a driver of this directive.  Instead, 
prevention focuses on the prevention of releases or their subsequent spread.  Although 
technically included, damage from GMOs is hardly included. 
 
Financial assurance mechanisms are needed, but are only ‘encouraged’ by the Member 
States.  Liability with vary significantly among Member States. 
 
The weakening of the directive, measured against the approaches initially recommended in 
the White Paper, is reminiscent of the weakening of the REACH initiative (Koch and 
Ashford, 2006). 
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